

TU Delft – July 5th, 2023

IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy

Sok: Pragmatic Assessment of Machine Learning for Network Intrusion Detection

Giovanni Apruzzese, Pavel Laskov, Johannes Schneider



GOAL

Changing the way research on Network Intrusion Detection (NID) based on Machine Learning (ML) is carried out.



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Changing the way research on Network Intrusion Detection (NID) based on Machine Learning (ML) is carried out.

WHY?

In research (20 years ago)...

An application of **machine learning** to network **intrusion detection**

- C Sinclair, L Pierce, S Matzner Proceedings 15th annual ..., 1999 ieeexplore.ieee.org
- ... machine learning techniques, we also intend to research other artificial intelligence methods applicable to intrusion detection... can detect will improve as our machine learning techniques ...

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[PDF] HIDE: a hierarchical **network intrusion detection** system using statistical preprocessing and **neural network** classification

- Z Zhang, J Li, CN Manikopoulos... Proc. IEEE Workshop ..., 2001 cs.rhodes.edu
- ... Intrusion DEtection (HIDE) system, which detects network-based attacks as anomalies using statistical preprocessing and neural network ... We tested five different types of neural network ...

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Intrusion detection using neural networks and support vector machines

- S Mukkamala, G Janoski, A Sung ... on Neural Networks. IJCNN' ..., 2002 ieeexplore.ieee.org
- ... standard benchmark for **intrusion detection** evaluations. Our goal for **intrusion detection** is to **detect** both anomalies and misuses. The approach is to train the **neural networks** or support ...
- ☆ Save ワワ Cite Cited by 1159 Related articles All 5 versions ≫



GOAL

Changing the way research on Network Intrusion Detection (NID) based on Machine Learning (ML) is carried out.

WHY?

"Application of ML in intrusion detection has been uneven at best, with deep and widespread (and generally justified) skepticism among subject matter experts" [9].

Markus de Shon (Lead of Detection Engineering at **NetFlix**) ...in practice (in 2020s)

According to a recent survey, over 75% of companies employ ML solutions for network security [65]. Most of such companies, however, *delegate* their cybersecurity to third-party vendors [66]. Indeed, several commercial products for NID actively leverage ML (e.g., [67]–[69]). Yet, all such products adopt ML methods that are decades old and mostly in their unsupervised form (e.g., the one-class SVM of [50] was proposed in 2002 [70]). Simply put, the integration of research endeavours into operational environments is slow in the context of ML-NIDS.



(Meanwhile, in Computer Vision...)

Hey, I have a new algorithm to generate synthetic images!



2014



2017





2022

...BUT WHY SO?

Lack of an "Universal" Dataset

2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

This was the

Outside the Closed World: On Using Machine Learning For Network Intrusion Detection

Robin Sommer
International Computer Science Institute, and
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

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Instead, we address another shortcoming...

The focus is on the ML model


- 1. Propose a "new" solution
- 2. Choose a given metric
- 3. Show that you "outperform" the state-of-the-art



...what about the rest?



What we do: (1) Practical Factors



Deployment of ML in NIDS must account for several factors *before* developing any ML model



The "value" of an ML model can be seen as a function of five factors:

1. System Infrastructure

(how does the ML model interact with the overarching system?)

An ML model is just a single component within a NIDS



The "value" of an ML model can be seen as a function of five factors:

1. System Infrastructure

(how does the ML model interact with the overarching system?)

2. Preprocessing

(what data is passed as input to the ML model?)

An ML model is just a single component within a NIDS

There exist dozens of tools to preprocess data



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(what data is passed as input to the ML model?)

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(how much data is required to train the ML model?)

An ML model is just a single component within a NIDS There exist do Zens of tools to preprocess data Even "unsupervised" ML algorithms need training weeks to collecti [75])



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(how much data is required to train the ML model?)

4. Hardware

(what platform is expected to run the ML model?)

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(how much data is required to train the ML model?)

4. Hardware

(what platform is expected to run the ML model?)

5. Unpredictability

(how to deal with the concept drift?)

An ML model is just a single component within a NIDS There exist do Zens of tools to preprocess data

Even "unsupervised" ML algorithms need training weeks to collecti [75]) There can be differences between train and inference hardware

The performance will deteriorate (eventually)



How can researchers meet the needs of practitioners?

1. System Infrastructure

→ Provide a schematic!





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2. Preprocessing

→ Report which tools





How can researchers meet the needs of practitioners?

1. System Infrastructure

→ Provide a schematic!

Readers will like it!

2. Preprocessing

→ Report which tools

n tools

3. Data Availability

→ Consider different amounts of training data

to outperform Sota



How can researchers meet the needs of practitioners?

1. System Infrastructure

→ Provide a schematic!



2. Preprocessing

→ Report which tools



3. Data Availability

→ Consider different amounts of training data



4. Hardware

→ Report the specifications of the evaluation platform





How can researchers meet the needs of practitioners?

Try also varying them!

1. System Infrastructure

→ Provide a schematic!



2. Preprocessing

→ Report which tools

3. Data Availability

→ Consider different amounts of training data

You do not "always" need

4. Hardware

→ Report the specifications of the evaluation platform

Measure the

5. Unpredictability

→ Assess as many "likely" operational scenarios as possible



(Some of our guidelines do overlap with those of Arp et al. [8]) $s_{0\eta_{e}}$

What we do: (3) State-of-the-Art?

How does the SotA "comply" with our recommendations?

Venues: S&P, EuroS&P, SEC, NDSS, CCS, AsiaCCS, RAID, DIMVA, ACSAC.



What we do: (3) State-of-the-Art?

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TABLE 2: State-of-the-Art: papers published since 2017 in top cyberse-curity conferences that consider applications of ML linked with NID.

Paper	Year	Hardware	Runtime	Adaptive	Stat. Sign.	Avail.	Pub. Data
Bortolamelotti [113]	2017	Х	X	✓	Х	X	X (1)
Ho [120]	2017	X	X	•	X	X	X (1)
Cho [121]	2017	X	X	✓	X	X	X (1)
Siadati [122]	2017	X	X	•	X	X	X (1)
Oprea [46]	2018	X	T	•	X	X	X (1)
Pereira [95]	2018	•	\mathbb{T}	•	X	✓	O (1)
Kheib [123]	2018	X	X	•	X	X	X (1)
Araujo [124]	2019	X	E	X	X	✓	X (1)
Mudgerikar [112]	2019	X	✓	X	X	X	X (1)
Mirsky [60]	2019	•	✓	•	X	X	✓ (1)
Feng [125]	2019	X	X	•	X	X	√ (2)
Milajerdi [114]	2019	•	✓	•	X	X	✓ (1)
Liu [126]	2019	•	X	•	X	X	√ (2)
Du [127]	2019	X	T	•	X	X	√ (3)
Erba [116]	2020	0	E	✓	Х	/	√ (2)
Bowman [98]	2020	•	E	X	X	X	√ (2)
Leichtnam [128]	2020	•	X	X	X	X	✓ (1)
Singla [129]	2020	×	×	X	X	✓	√ (2)
Han [130]	2020	✓	✓	•	X	X	✓ (2)
Jan [131]	2020	×	×	✓	✓	✓	X (1)
Ghorbani [132]	2021	✓	E	•	Х	X	X (1)
Nabeel [133]	2021	X	×	•	X	X	X (1)
Wang [115]	2021	X	\mathbb{E}	✓	X	X	√ (2)
Piszkozub [134]	2021	X	X	•	X	X	O (2)
Yuan [135]	2021	X	×	•	X	✓	✓ (1)
Yang [136]	2021	X	×	•	✓	X	✓ (1)
Barradas [137]	2021	•	✓	•	X	X	✓ (1)
Han [138]	2021	✓	✓	✓	X	✓	√ (2)
Liang [139]	2021	X	\mathbb{T}	•	✓	✓	✓ (1)
Fu [140]	2021	•	✓	✓	X	X	√ (3)

Venues: S&P, EuroS&P, SEC, NDSS, CCS, AsiaCCS, RAID, DIMVA, ACSAC.

TABLE 5: State-of-the-Art (2022): papers published in top cybersecurity conferences that consider applications of ML linked with NID.

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Apruzzese [79]	2022	✓	\mathbb{T}	X	/	✓	✓ (3)
Arp [8]	2022	X	X	•	X	X	✓ (1)
D'hooge [179]	2022	X	X	×	×	✓	√ (8)
Dodia [170]	2022	X	X	X	✓	X	✓ (1)
Erba [177]	2022	X	X	✓	X	X	✓ (1)
Feng [180]	2022	✓	/	•	X	✓	√ (1)
Fu [181]	2022	1	E	•	X	X	√ (2)
Jacobs [178]	2022	X	X	×	X	X	√ (6)
King [182]	2022	✓	✓	×	X	✓	√ (3)
Landen [183]	2022	X	\mathbb{T}	/	×	✓	X (1)
Sharma [184]	2022	•	X	•	X	X	X (1)
Tekiner [185]	2022	1	E	✓	/	/	√ (3)
Van Ede [61]	2022	1	/	✓	X	/	√ (1)
Wang [186]	2022	✓	✓	✓	X	/	✓ (1)
Wang [187]	2022	X	×	×	X	X	√ (3)
Wolsing [169]	2022	X	×	X	X	×	√ (3)



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Siadati [122]	2017	×	×	•	X	X	X (1)
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Pereira [95]	2018	•	\mathbb{T}	•	X	✓	O (1)
Kheib [123]	2018	X	X	•	X	X	X (1)
Araujo [124]	2019	X	E	X	X	✓	X (1)
Mudgerikar [112]	2019	X	✓	X	X	X	X (1)
Mirsky [60]	2019	•	✓	•	X	X	✓ (1)
Feng [125]	2019	X	X	•	X	X	√ (2)
Milajerdi [114]	2019	•	✓	•	X	X	✓ (1)
Liu [126]	2019	•	X	•	X	X	√ (2)
Du [127]	2019	X	\mathbb{T}	•	×	X	√ (3)
Erba [116]	2020	•	E	✓	X	✓	√ (2)
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Leichtnam [128]	2020	•	X	X	X	X	✓ (1)
Singla [129]	2020	X	X	X	X	✓	√ (2)
Han [130]	2020	✓	✓	•	X	X	√ (2)
Jan [131]	2020	X	X	✓	✓	✓	X (1)
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Yuan [135]	2021	X	×	•	X	✓	✓ (1)
Yang [136]	2021	X	X	•	✓	X	√ (1)
Barradas [137]	2021	•	/	•	X	X	✓ (1)
Han [138]	2021	✓	✓	✓	X	✓	√ (2)
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Dodia [170]	2022	X	×	X	/	X	✓ (1)
Erba [177]	2022	×	×	✓	X	X	✓ (1)
Feng [180]	2022	✓	✓	•	X	/	✓ (1)
Fu [181]	2022	✓	E	•	X	X	√ (2)
Jacobs [178]	2022	X	×	X	X	X	√ (6)
King [182]	2022	✓	✓	X	X	/	√ (3)
Landen [183]	2022	X	\mathbb{T}	/	X	/	X (1)
Sharma [184]	2022	•	×	•	X	X	X (1)
Tekiner [185]	2022	✓	E	/	/	/	√ (3)
Van Ede [61]	2022	✓	✓	✓	X	/	✓ (1)
Wang [186]	2022	✓	✓	/	X	/	✓ (1)
Wang [187]	2022	X	×	X	X	X	√ (3)
Wolsing [169]	2022	×	×	X	X	X	√ (3)

We added this during the peer-review! (There is an improvement over the previous 5 years)





All papers consider "open-world" scenarios

No paper changes the preprocessing tool

What we do: (4) Practitioners' opinion – A

User study with 12 practitioners with hands-on experience on ML and NID, who are acquainted with research and work in renown security companies.

"How important is this factor?"

Factor	Not important	Important	Crucial
System Infrastructure			
Preprocessing			
Data Availability			
Hardware			
Unpredictability			




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"How important is this factor?"

Factor	Not important	Important	Crucial
System Infrastructure	9%	27%	64%
Preprocessing	0%	9%	91%
Data Availability	9%	18%	73%
Hardware	9%	64%	27%
Unpredictability	9%	18%	73%

- Preprocessing is the most relevant
- Hardware is the least relevant



What we do: (4) Practitioners' opinion – B

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	2017	×	×	/ 0	×	×	X (1) X (1)
	2017	x	x	7	x	x	X (1)
	2017	x	x	0	x	x	X (1)
	2018	×	T	0	×	×	X (1)
	2018	•	T	•	X	/	O (1)
	2018	X	X	•	X	X	X (1)
	2019	X	E	×	×	/	X (1)
	2019	×	/	X	X	X	X (1)
	2019	•	1	•	X	X	✓ (1)
	2019	×	X	•	X	X	✓ (2)
	2019	•	✓	•	X	X	✓ (1)
	2019	•	X	•	X	X	✓ (2)
	2019	X	T	•	X	X	✓ (3)
	2020	0	E	/	X	/	✓ (2)
	2020	•	E	×	×	×	✓ (2)
	2020	•	X	×	×	X	✓ (1)
	2020	×	X	X	×	/	✓ (2)
	2020	/	✓	0	×	X	✓ (2)
	2020	X	X	✓	✓	/	X (1)
	2021	/	E	•	×	×	X (1)
	2021	X	X	•	X	X	X (1)
	2021	×	E	/	×	X	✓ (2)
	2021	X	X	•	X	X	O (2)
	2021	×	X	•	X	✓	✓ (1)
	2021	X	X	0	✓	X	✓ (1)
	2021	0	✓.	0	X	X	✓ (1)
	2021	/	✓	/	×	/	✓ (2)
	2021	X	T	0	✓	✓	✓ (1)
	2021	•	/	/	×	×	√ (3)

We did this in 2022

"How problematic is it that..."

Column (Issue)	Not very Problematic	Problematic (but OK)	Very problematic
Poor Hardware			
Poor Runtime			
Poor Adaptive atk.			
Poor Stat. Sign.			
Poor Data Availab.			
Poor Pub. Data			



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Paper	Year	Hardware	Runtime	Adaptive	Stat. Sign.	Avail.	Pub. Data
	2017	X	X	/	X	X	X (1)
	2017 2017	X	X	0	X	X	X (1)
	2017	X	X	ó	×	X	X (1)
	2017	X	X			X	X (1)
	2018	×	T	•	X	X	X (1)
	2018	•	T	•	X	/	O (1)
	2018	×	X	•	X	X	X (1)
	2019	X	E	X	Х	/	X (1)
	2019	×	/	X	X	X	X (1)
	2019	•	/	•	X	X	✓ (1)
	2019	×	X	•	X	X	✓ (2)
	2019	•	/	•	X	X	✓ (1)
	2019	•	X	•	×	X	✓ (2)
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	2020	. 0	E	/	×	/	✓ (2)
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	2020	•	X	X	X	X	✓ (1)
	2020	×	X	X	×	/	✓ (2)
	2020	/	/	•	X	X	✓ (2)
	2020	×	X	/	/	/	X (1)
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	2021	•	✓	/	×	X	√ (3)

We did this in 2022

"How problematic is it that..."

Column (Issue)	Not very Problematic	Problematic (but OK)	Very problematic
Poor Hardware	25%	75%	0%
Poor Runtime	0%	75%	25%
Poor Adaptive atk.	8%	67%	25%
Poor Stat. Sign.	0%	10%	90%
Poor Data Availab.	16%	42%	42%
Poor Pub. Data	0%	41%	59%

Note2: we made them change their mind on hardware and runtime!



We showcase how to apply *all* our guidelines in research.

We do so by re-assessing existing methods for Netflow classification.

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- 5 well-known public datasets (from diverse network environments)
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We evaluate all of the above in: (i) open-world, (ii) closed-world, and (iii) adversarial settings. We consider random split and temporal splits. $\frac{T_{here\ is\ no}}{diff_{ere\ ncel}}$

We repeat all the random splits 100 times (to compute statistically significant results)

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We evaluate all of the above in: (i) open-world, (ii) closed-world, and (iii) adversarial settings.

We consider random split and temporal splits. difference!

We repeat all the random splits 100 times (to compute statistically significant results)

We measure the true positive rate, false positive rate, inference time, training time.

We showcase how to apply *all* our guidelines in research.

We do so by re-assessing existing methods for *Netflow classification*.

We consider:

- 5 well-known public datasets (from diverse network environments)
 - Each generated with a different NetFlow tool
- 4 amounts of data availability (from 100s to 80% of total dataset)
- 2 feature sets ("large" and "small")
- 6 ML pipelines (single classifiers, ensembles, and even a cascade)
- 4 ML algorithms (no deep learning!) OL is impracticall
- 6 Hardware platforms (from a Raspberry Pi4B to an HPC)

We evaluate all of the above in: (i) open-world, (ii) closed-world, and (iii) adversarial settings.

We consider random split and temporal splits. difference!

We repeat all the random splits 100 times (to compute statistically significant results)

We measure the true positive rate, false positive rate, inference time, training time.

(Source code available at https://github.com/hihey54/pragmaticAssessment)

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
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	Intel Core i5-8600K @ 3.60GHz	Intel Core i5-650 @ 3.20GHz
Price	\$118.6 - BUY	\$74.98 - BUY
Socket Type	FCLGA1151-2	LGA1156
CPU Class	Desktop	Desktop
Clockspeed	3.6 GHz	3.2 GHz
Turbo Speed	Up to 4.3 GHz	Up to 3.5 GHz
# of Physical Cores	6 (Threads: 6)	2 (Threads: 4)
Cache	L1: 256KB, L2: 1.0MB, L3: 9MB	L1: 256KB, L2: 1.0MB, L3: 4MB
TDP	95W	73W
Yearly Running Cost	\$17.34	\$13.32

Reporting the complete specifications can determine the "winner" among 2+ ML methods



CPU Mark Rating					
As of 1st of July 2023 - Higher results represent better performance					
Intel Core i5-8600K @ 3.60GHz	10,229				
Intel Core i5-650 @ 3.20GHz	2,235				
PassMark Software © 2008-2023					

REMARK

We do a massive re-assessment, but not all research <u>must</u> do <u>all of</u> what we suggest

There is value even in "small" evaluations, if appropriate to test a given hypothesis!



TAKEAWAY

We want to see our research have a better impact to the (practical) real world.

In our user-study with practitioners, we asked a final question:

"In general, do you think that research papers facilitate the practitioners' job in determining the real value of the proposed ML methods?"

- 92% are "uncertain"
- 8% are "left with more questions than answers after reading a research paper"

Our paper can hopefully inspire the change we want to see.





TU Delft – July 5th, 2023

IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy

Sok: Pragmatic Assessment of Machine Learning for Network Intrusion Detection

Giovanni Apruzzese, Pavel Laskov, Johannes Schneider

