

Munich, March 25th 2026

IEEE 4th Conference on Secure and Trustworthy Machine Learning

ConCap: Practical Network Traffic Generation for (ML- and) Flow-based Intrusion Detection Systems

Miel Verkerken, Laurens d'Hooge, Bruno Volckaert, Filip de Turck, Giovanni Apruzzese



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ConCap: Practical Network Traffic Generation for (ML- and) Flow-based Intrusion Detection Systems

This is not about Generative AI


Miel Verkerken, Laurens d'Hooge, Bruno Volckaert, Filip de Turck, [Giovanni Apruzzese](#)





Network Intrusion Detection Systems

ML / AI / DL




Research interest in NIDS. Queries issued on September 2025.




The following paper was originally published in the
Proceedings of the 7th USENIX Security Symposium
San Antonio, Texas, January 26-29, 1998

Data Mining Approaches for Intrusion Detection

Wenke Lee and Salvatore J. Stolfo
Columbia University





How can a researcher obtain network-related data for (ML-)NIDS experiments??



Obtaining network-related data

- a. Real-world capture
- b. Simulation
- c. 'Benchmark' Datasets



Obtaining network-related data

- a. Real-world capture
- b. Simulation
- c. 'Benchmark' Datasets 😊



Obtaining network-related data

- a. Real-world capture → availability?
- b. Simulation → realism?
- c. 'Benchmark' Datasets 😊



2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops

Troubleshooting an Intrusion Detection Dataset: the CICIDS2017 Case Study

Gints Engelen, Vera Rimmer, and Wouter Joosen
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
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2021 IEEE Symposium on e

2022 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)

Error Prevalence in NIDS datasets: A Case Study on CIC-IDS-2017 and CSE-CIC-IDS-2018

Lisa Liu^{1*}, Gints Engelen^{2*}, Timothy Lynar¹, Daryl Essam¹, Wouter Joosen²

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Bad Design Smells in Benchmark NIDS Datasets

TABLE 1: Dataset Summary

Dataset	Year	Class	Feat.	Hosts	Cit. ¹
CIC IDS 2017	2017	14	80	14	3264
CIC IDS 2018	2018	16	80	500	3264
ICSX 2012	2012	2/5 ²	20	25	1365
UNSW-NB15	2015	10	49	45	2817
Ton_IoT	2019	10	44	12	254
Bot-IoT	2021	5	45	10	1217
CTU-13	2014	13	15	-	866

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2024 9th IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (Euro&SP)
Security (CNS)
Study on

Bad Design Smells in Benchmark NIDS Datasets


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
Gints Engelen
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There is a 'data' problem in (ML-)NIDS research.









Obtaining network-related data

- a. Real-world capture
- b. Simulation
- c. Benchmark




RESEARCH GOAL. We seek to develop an *open-source* tool that enables the automatic *generation* (and *labeling*) of network traffic data that resembles that of a real network.




kubernetes

Attacker Pod



Target Pod



ConCap (Container Capture)





Fig. 2: **Overview of ConCap.** [left] ConCap configured with two NetFlow extractors and three scenarios, [mid] executing all scenarios simultaneously on the cluster. [right] A view of a running scenario's attacker and target pods.




Fig. 3: **Multi-target scenario with ConCap.** [left] ConCap supports advanced multi-step attack chains, [mid] performed over multiple targets. [right] The traffic is captured and processed per target, enabling per-target labeling.



RESEARCH QUESTION #1: Does ConCap generate network traffic that resembles that of a physical network?



TABLE I: Broad analysis of various network activities. We quantitatively and qualitatively compare the number of packets and NetFlows generated by our bare-metal and ConCap environments across 10 network activities.

Tool	Number of Packets		CICFlowMeter Flows		Argus Flows	
	Bare-metal	ConCap	Bare-metal	ConCap	Bare-metal	ConCap
ping						
dig						
mysql						
curl/ftp						
nmap						
nmap (-sV)						
patator (SSH)						
patator (FTP)						
slowloris						
wfuzz						



TABLE I: Broad analysis of various network activities. We quantitatively and qualitatively compare the number of packets and NetFlows generated by our bare-metal and ConCap environments across 10 network activities.

Tool	Number of Packets		CICFlowMeter Flows		Argus Flows	
	Bare-metal	ConCap	Bare-metal	ConCap	Bare-metal	ConCap
ping	20	20	1	1	10	10
dig	10	10	5	5	5	5
mysql	37	27	1	1	1	1
curl/ftp	4910	1675	2	2	2	2
nmap	5	5	2	2	2	2
nmap (-sV)	128	103	10	10	11	11
patator (SSH)	30 960	31 485	680	680	680	680
patator (FTP)	2093	1860	70	70	70	70
slowloris	21 300	21 305	1500	1500	1500	1500
wfuzz	2310	2086	15	15	15	15



RESEARCH QUESTION #1: Does ConCap generate network traffic that resembles that of a physical network?

ANSWER TO RQ1. Our packet- and NetFlow-level analyses revealed that the network traffic generated by ConCap resembles that of a physical network. Deviations are due to expected differences in the network channel, which are impossible to control—but do not affect the payload content.



RESEARCH QUESTION #2: To what extent is the traffic generated by ConCap deterministic?



TABLE III: **RQ evaluation.** We repeat the scenarios with ConCap 100 times.

Environment	Attack	Packets		Number of Flows	
		Count	Sum of Bytes	CICFlowMeter	Argus
ConCap	Ping scan	20 ± 0	1960 ± 0	1 ± 0	10 ± 0
	Basic Port Scan	13 ± 0	694 ± 0	5 ± 0	6 ± 0
	Full Port Scan	2504 ± 6	$239\,401 \pm 4631$	1098 ± 1	1092 ± 1
	SSH Bruteforce	$26\,960 \pm 354$	$4\,759\,703 \pm 23\,353$	680 ± 0	679 ± 0



TABLE III: **RQ evaluation.** We repeat the scenarios with ConCap 100 times.

Environment	Attack	Packets		Number of Flows	
		Count	Sum of Bytes	CICFlowMeter	Argus
Bare-Metal	Ping scan	20 ± 0	1960 ± 0	1 ± 0	10 ± 0
	Basic Port Scan	13 ± 0	736 ± 0	5 ± 0	6 ± 0
	Full Port Scan	2751 ± 88	$271\,551 \pm 6235$	1091 ± 43	1093 ± 43
	SSH Bruteforce	$30\,935 \pm 37$	$5\,060\,797 \pm 2417$	680 ± 0	679 ± 0
ConCap	Ping scan	20 ± 0	1960 ± 0	1 ± 0	10 ± 0
	Basic Port Scan	13 ± 0	694 ± 0	5 ± 0	6 ± 0
	Full Port Scan	2504 ± 6	$239\,401 \pm 4631$	1098 ± 1	1092 ± 1
	SSH Bruteforce	$26\,960 \pm 354$	$4\,759\,703 \pm 23\,353$	680 ± 0	679 ± 0



RESEARCH QUESTION #2: To what extent is the traffic generated by ConCap deterministic?

ANSWER TO RQ2. Traffic generated by ConCap is deterministic content-wise, but the nondeterministic nature of networking results in small variations in packets and bytes. Variations are due to how data is acknowledged (e.g., using a separate TCP packet) and should not impact the outcome of a scientific experiment. ConCap does not just simulate network traffic, it generates it such that it resembles physical networks—whose real-world behavior is unpredictable [21].



(some) Applications of ConCap



TABLE V: Real-world equivalence. Network traffic generated with ConCap is compatible with a real-world "smart home" network.

Train Set	$B+\mathcal{P}$			$B+\bar{\mathcal{P}}$		
Test Set	B	\mathcal{P}	$\bar{\mathcal{P}}$	B	\mathcal{P}	$\bar{\mathcal{P}}$
DT	<0.001	1.000	0.899	<0.001	>0.999	>0.999
RF	0.000	1.000	0.899	0.000	1.000	1.000
XGB	0.000	>0.999	0.889	<0.001	1.000	1.000
SVM	0.000	1.000	1.000	<0.001	1.000	1.000
DNN	<0.001	1.000	1.000	<0.001	1.000	1.000



TABLE IV: **Reproducibility of prior work.** We show ConCap-generated data is functionally equivalent to that of existing benchmark datasets.

Train Set		$\mathcal{B}+\mathcal{P}$			$\mathcal{B}+\bar{\mathcal{P}}$		
Test Set		\mathcal{B}	\mathcal{P}	$\bar{\mathcal{P}}$	\mathcal{B}	\mathcal{P}	$\bar{\mathcal{P}}$
CICIDS17	DT	<0.001	0.997	0.917	<0.001	0.980	1.000
	RF	0.000	0.998	1.000	0.000	0.986	1.000
	XGB	<0.001	0.998	0.869	<0.001	1.000	1.000
	SVM	<0.001	0.993	0.907	<0.001	0.993	1.000
	DNN	0.000	0.998	0.920	<0.001	0.996	1.000
CICIDS18	DT	0.000	1.000	0.859	<0.001	1.000	1.000
	RF	0.000	1.000	0.859	<0.001	1.000	1.000
	XGB	0.000	1.000	0.859	<0.001	0.984	1.000
	SVM	0.000	1.000	0.907	<0.001	1.000	1.000
	DNN	0.000	1.000	0.907	<0.001	1.000	1.000




Fig. 5: Using ConCap to reproduce complex attack chains envisioned in MITRE ATT&CK. The attacker first compromises an exposed target before performing lateral movement to two internal hosts.



TABLE VI: Testing existing ML-NIDS against unseen CVEs with ConCap.

We develop benchmark ML-NIDS using CICIDS17 (baseline $tpr=0.999$ with $fpr=0.001$) and CICIDS18 (baseline $tpr=0.999$ with $fpr=0.001$). Then, we use ConCap to generate and label NetFlows of three CVEs (we report the # Packets and # NetFlows of each capture) involving completely different attacks than those used to “train” the ML-NIDS, and we test them against all of our models (RF, DT, SVM, DNN, HGB). The results show the average tpr (and std. dev.) across all models.

Attack	Traffic Statistics		CICIDS17	CICIDS18
	# Packets	# NetFlows	tpr (std. dev)	tpr (std. dev)
CVE-2024-47177	44658	4800	0.205 (0.389)	0.550 (0.396)
CVE-2024-36401	10372	640	0.199 (0.399)	0.214 (0.378)
CVE-2024-2961	391350	1280	0.112 (0.224)	0.011 (0.021)



Operational requirements

- Memory footprint: <40MB
- CPU-utilization: <10%
- Initialization time: <3s



Conclusions

- ConCap is an open-source tool for network-traffic generation (<https://github.com/idlab-discover/ConCap>)
- Traffic generated by ConCap resembles that of a real-world network and can be used for ML-related experiments (due to automated and 100%-accurate NetFlow labeling)
- ConCap ‘unlocks’ the possibility to test new attacks in a safe and research-friendly environment

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Common Setup and Workflow. The experiments discussed in this section entail two distinct environments.

- *Physical network.* Two “bare-metal” physical hosts, each having six Intel Core i5-9400, 32GB RAM running Ubuntu 20.04.6 and connected by a 1 Gbit switch.
- *ConCap.* A Kubernetes cluster (v1.29.0) with 1 control plane and 3 worker nodes. Each node has 16GB RAM, four Intel Xeon E5-2640v4, running Ubuntu 22.04.3. The machines are interconnected by a 10 Gbit switch.