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ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security

The Impact of Emerging Phishing Threats: Assessing Quishing and LLM-generated Phishing Emails Against Organizations

Marie Weinz, Luca Allodi, Nicola Zannone, Giovanni Apruzzese





LLM-generated Phishing Emails

Google

ai generated emails phishing



Mailgun

https://www.mailgun.com > Blog

The golden age of scammers: Al-powered phishing

With generative AI, scammers can now send phishing emails to remove language barriers, reply in real time, and almost instantly automate mass personalized ...



Hoxhunt

https://hoxhunt.com > blog > ai-phishing-attacks

Al Phishing Attacks: How Big is the Threat? (+Infographic)

Feb 19, 2025 — We found that of 386,000 malicious **phishing emails**, only a tiny fraction – between 0.7% and 4.7% – were actually crafted by **artificial** ...

The current state of Al phishing...

The dark reality of Al-driven...



StrongestLayer

https://www.strongestlayer.com > blog > ai-generated-p...

Al-Generated Phishing: The Top Enterprise Threat of 2025

Aug 18, 2025 — Al-generated phishing is the top email threat of 2025, outpacing ransomware, insider risk, and all other vectors.



sosafe-awareness.com

https://sosafe-awareness.com > company > press > one-i...

1 in 5 People Click Al-Generated Phishing Emails - SoSafe

Research from SoSafe's social engineering team shows that **generative Al tools can help hacker** groups compose phishing emails at least 40% faster.




Malwarebytes

https://www.malwarebytes.com > cybercrime > 2025/01

Al-supported spear phishing fools more than 50% of targets

Jan 7, 2025 — Researchers have conducted a scientific study into the effectiveness of Al supported

LLM-generated Phishing Emails



LLM-generated Phishing Emails

Malwarebytes

https://www.malwarebytes.com > cybercrim

Al-supported spear phishing for

Jan 7, 2025 — Researchers have conducted

Google https://www.ibm.com > think > x-force > ai-vs-human-... ai generated emails phishing Al vs. human deceit: Unravelling the new age of phishing ... Oct 24, 2023 — ... ChatGPT to generate phishing emails tailored to specific industry sectors. To https://www.mailgun.com > Blog start, we asked ChatGPT to detail the primary areas of concern ... The golden age of scammers: Al-powered r Overview Round one: The rise of the ... With generative AI, scammers can now send phishing emai real time, and almost instantly automate mass personalized .. https://www.ibm.com > think > insights > generative-ai-... Generative Al Makes Social Engineering More Dangerous ... https://hoxhunt.com > blog > ai-phishing-attacks May 19, 2025 — Many attackers have adopted generative Al like an intern or assistant, using it to build Al Phishing Attacks: How Big is the Threat? websites, generate malicious code and even write phishing emails. Feb 19, 2025 — We found that of 386,000 malicious phishing 0.7% and 4.7% – were actually crafted by **artificial** ... VentureBeat https://venturebeat.com > ai > ibm-x-force-pits-chatgpt-a... The dark reality of Al-driven The current state of Al phishing... https://news.aibase.com > news StrongestLaver https://www.strongestlayer.com > blog > ai-g ChatGPT Excels at Generating Deceptive Phishing Emails Al-Generated Phishing: The To IBM's research found that **phishing emails generated by ChatGPT are deceptive**. Although the clickthrough rate is slightly lower than human-generated emails, ... Aug 18, 2025 — Al-generated phishing is insider risk, and all other vectors. https://hoxhunt.com > guide > phishing-trends-report sosafe-awareness.com Phishing Trends Report (Updated for 2025) https://sosafe-awareness.com > company The 2022 surge might be linked to the advent of ChatGPT and the rise of blackhat generative AI that 1 in 5 People Click Al-Generat year. The subsequent years where growth leveled off ... Research from SoSafe's social engineering groups compose phishing emails at leas

https://www.axios.com > Axios > Technology

ChatGPT-written phishing emails are already scary good

efforts to limit its ability to do harm, according to new IBM research.


Oct 24, 2023 — ChatGPT is already pretty good at writing believable phishing emails, despite

nail in minutes


Quishing?



Quishing Emails are popular nowadays




Quishing Emails are popular nowadays



How QR Code Phishing Attacks Work

Quishing Emails are popular nowadays





> Because Quishing emails bypass phishing filters




> Because Quishing emails bypass phishing filters

...and we tested this!








(a) Details of the malicious URL (https://arub330011.page.link/jdF1) according to Phishtank [7] (in November 2024).

giovanni.apruzzese@uni.li

Why are Quishing emails problematic?



(a) Detail tank [7] (

(c) Verification that the URL was known to be malicious by well-known providers (e.g., CISCO).

g to Phish


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


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Are Quishing emails truly problematic?

Quishing emails bypass phishing filters...



Are Quishing emails truly problematic?

Quishing emails bypass phishing filters...

...but how effective are quishing emails against employees (i.e., humans)???



So, what did we truly do?



Cross-organizational study across 3 companies

Table 1: Overview of Companies. For our research, we considered three companies whose businesses is predominantly located in Central Europe.

	Small Company (\mathbb{C}_s)	Medium Company (\mathbb{C}_m)	Huge Company (\mathbb{C}_h)
# Employees	between 50 and 250	≈1 500	>30 000
Industry	Hospitality	Finance	Manufacturing
CSA Training Frequency	Yearly	Yearly	Biyearly
CSA Training Approaches	Slides, Texts	Slides, Videos, Texts, Classes	Slides, Videos, Text, Classes, eLearning
In-house Simulations?	X	\checkmark	✓
CSA Training Specificity	Generic	Generic	Group-specific
Emerging Trends in CSA?	X	X	√
Simulation Framework	(GoPhish [3])	MS Defender [6]	MS Defender [6]



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RQ1: Are Quishing emails more (or less) effective at deceiving end users than traditional button-based "click-through" emails?

RQ2: What are the effects of LLM-generated and OSINT-based phishing emails against modern organizations' employees?



(RQ2: LLM+OSINT) Setup





Fig. 2: Extraction and exploitation of OSINT for \mathbb{E}_L . Operations denoted with a "brain-cog" image have been carried out with an LLM.

(RQ2: LLM+OSINT) Email





(c) Example of OSINT+LLM phishing email (\mathbb{E}_L).

The large "image placeholder" was replaced with an image taken from a press release of the specific company.

(RQ2: LLM+OSINT) Results

Table 3: Results of the OSINT-fed LLM-generated phishing email.

Company	Small	Medium	Huge	AGG
Emails sent	18	589	17 753	18 360
Emails read	12	397	11 025	11 434
Page visited	8	125	499	632
Credentials submitted	3	59	243	305
Page visited / Email read	66.6%	31.5%	4.5%	5.5%
Cred. sub. / Email read	25.0%	14.9%	2.2%	2.7%



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(RQ2: LLM+OSINT) Was it hard?

Table 4: Sequence of Prompts used to craft \mathbb{E}_L . Text in regular font are not part of the prompt; the last prompt is optional. We do not show the prompts used to "jailbreak" the model (to avoid helping attackers).

#	Prompt
1	Please help me summarize the weaknesses this company has according to this employer rating website. [Extra input: data extracted from Kununu]
2	If I were an attacker, which weakness would be the best to leverage in a phishing attack?
3	Please give me one concrete example of a potential phishing mail leveraging this weakness.
4	Please analyse these postings for me and give me the 5 most common topics that this company cares about. [Extra input: data extracted from LinkedIn]
5	Please write me a brief introduction to a company survey directed at employees regarding the latest company efforts in relation to [topic from prompt #4] at [company]. The introduction is meant to accompany the link to the survey. Here is some additional information the employees are already aware of. [Extra input: text from press releases]
	Shorter please [Note: only added if the output was longer than 100 words so that it would still be readable]



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
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(RQ1: Quishing vs Phishing email)




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
(a) Example of button "click-through" email (\mathbb{E}_B). The "info@testmail.de" was replaced with a company-related email address.

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(RQ1: Quishing vs Phishing email) Emails



(a) Example of button "click-through" email (\mathbb{E}_B). The "info@testmail.de" was replaced with a company-related email address.



(b) Example of QR-code phishing email (\mathbb{E}_Q). Note that the design is identical to \mathbb{E}_B aside from the button being replaced with a QR-code.

(RQ1: Quishing vs Phishing email) Reflection

How does a user "scan" a QR code?



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How does a user "scan" a QR code?

Scan the QR code to get started

Use your phone camera app to scan the QR code. This will start the process of verifying your account with Microsoft.



If the problem continues, forward this message to your email admin. For additional support https://www.microsoft.com/en-au/trust-center



(RQ1: Quishing vs Phishing email) Reflection

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→ We hypothesize that Quishing emails are less effective than traditional click-through emails (because QR codes are cumbersome to "scan")



(RQ1: Quishing vs Phishing email) Results

Company	Small Co	ompany Medium Comp.		Huge Co	mpany	AGGREGATE		
Email	\mathbb{E}_{B}		$ig \mathbb{E}_B ig $		\mathbb{E}_B		\mathbb{E}_{B}	
Emails sent	21		567		17 751		18 339	
Emails read	9		312		11 538		11 859	
Page visited	2		12		936		950	
Page visited / Email read	22.2%		3.9%		8.1%		8.0%	




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Email	\mathbb{E}_B	\mathbb{E}_Q	$ig $ \mathbb{E}_B	\mathbb{E}_Q	\mathbb{E}_B	\mathbb{E}_Q	\mathbb{E}_{B}	\mathbb{E}_Q	
Emails sent	21	21	567	558	17 751	34 031	18 339	34 610	
Emails read	9	13	312	317	11 538	24 842	11 859	25 172	
Page visited	2	3	12	17	936	1 950	950	1 970	
Page visited / Email read	22.2%	23.1%	3.9%	5.4%	8.1%	7.9%	8.0%	7.8%	



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














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
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(b) Example of QR-code phishing email (\mathbb{E}_Q). Note that the design is identical to \mathbb{E}_B aside from the button being replaced with a QR-code.






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One last word about Quishing emails

in a less-secure network)



Conclusions

- Cross-organizational study across 3 diverse companies
- Sent over 70k emails across 3 phishing simulations
- There is no statistically significant difference between using QR codes and clickthrough buttons for luring users to phishing webpages
- Combining LLMs and OSINT is a cheap (and, we argue, effective) way of conveying phishing emails




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Table 2: Results of \mathbb{E}_B , \mathbb{E}_Q , and \mathbb{E}_L . We recall (§4.2.2) that, for \mathbb{C}_h , the simulation of \mathbb{E}_Q was not managed by us: the email was sent to more employees and no data was logged about the credentials submitted. Therefore, numbers with an asterisk (*) have been derived by removing the \mathbb{E}_Q of \mathbb{C}_h from the pool.

Company	Company \mathbb{C}_s (Small Company)		\mathbb{C}_m (N	\mathbb{C}_m (Medium Company)			\mathbb{C}_h (Huge Company)			AGGREGATE		
Email	\mathbb{E}_B	\mathbb{E}_Q	\mathbb{E}_L	\mathbb{E}_B	\mathbb{E}_Q	\mathbb{E}_L	\mathbb{E}_B	\mathbb{E}_Q	\mathbb{E}_L	\mathbb{E}_B	\mathbb{E}_Q	\mathbb{E}_L
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Page visited	2	3	8	12	17	125	936	1 950	499	950	1 970	632
Credentials submitted	1	1	3	9	6	59	531	n/a	243	541	7*	305
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Cred. sub. / Email read	11.1%	7.7%	25.0%	2.9%	1.9%	14.9%	4.6%	n/a	2.2%	4.6%	2.1%*	2.7%





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